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Abstract: New energy vehicles (NEVs) have been proposed as a promising technology to reduce 10 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. China is one of the leading countries in the development of 11 
NEVs, and a wide range of companies, including large and smaller businesses, are involved in the 12 
Chinese NEV market. Given that the NEV market involves the creation of nascent technologies, 13 
there are significant barriers to the development of NEV companies in the business growth stage. 14 
This is particularly significant in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This 15 
study surveyed 100 NEV SMEs in China using a structured questionnaire to determine the most 16 
significant barriers to the growth of their businesses. Calculating the relative importance index 17 
(RII) from the collected questionnaire responses revealed that the most significant barrier at the 18 
growth stage is the lack of skilled scientists in China. The most important category of barriers is 19 
legal and institutional barriers, which suggests that government intervention in business activities, 20 
taxes, and unclear regulations are viewed by entrepreneurs as a serous hindrance to further 21 
development in the NEV industry. 22 
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 24 
1. Introduction 25 
1.1. Background 26 
New energy vehicles (NEVs) are powered by sustainable sources such as electricity rather than 27 
the combustible fuel used in traditional vehicles. NEVs have been recommended as alternatives to 28 
traditional vehicles as a result of the increasing acceptance of the role played by human activity in 29 
causing climate change. Of the human activities that have a significant impact on the environment, 30 
vehicular emissions that arise from the need for transportation are a significant contributor; an 31 
estimated 26% of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are attributed to transportation, including 32 
the use of cars, road freight, and aviation [1]. Further, developing countries have witnessed strong 33 
growth in domestic demand for motorization in recent years. As a result, the potential increase in the 34 
number of private vehicles added to the roads in the world will be likely to overwhelm the benefits 35 
to be gained from the use of cleaner fuels. This suggests that a range of measures need to be applied 36 
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions [2]. NEVs are thus a promising measure to reduce GHGs 37 
and have been proposed as a solution to reducing air pollution in countries such as China [3]. NEVs 38 
show promise for a country like China for several reasons. First, given enough demand, a move 39 
towards partial or fully electric powered vehicles could reduce a country’s dependence on 40 
petroleum imports. This is particularly significant for a country like China, which is a net crude oil 41 
importer. Second, China already suffers significantly from air pollution and the use of NEVs could 42 
significantly militate against this [4].  43 
 44 
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 1.2 Research question and justification 45 
The research question that this dissertation aims to answer is “What are the barriers to further 46 
development of new energy vehicle (NEV) small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China at 47 
the growth stage?” There are several reasons why NEVs are interesting. First, as noted above, any 48 
moves towards partial or fully electric powered vehicles have the potential to reduce the country’s 49 
dependence on petroleum imports. This increases energy security for a net importer like China. 50 
Second, internal combustion engines emit pollution, and China already suffers from severe air 51 
pollution due to the country’s recent history vis-à-vis its industrial development trajectory. Thus, 52 
NEVs can shift China towards a more sustainable development model while reducing the country’s 53 
contribution to global climate change. An answer to this research question is also especially timely 54 
given that the Chinese government has initiated programs such as the “Thousands of Vehicles, Tens 55 
of Cities” to increase NEV commercialization [3]. This investigation could therefore shed some light 56 
on whether the government’s efforts have thus far been successful and provide some policy 57 
guidance on the measures that need to be implemented or adjusted to increase the adoption rate of 58 
NEVs. 59 
1.3 Research justification 60 
China’s NEV industry is nascent; as a result, there have been relatively few studies conducted 61 
on the NEV industry in that country. Gong et al.’s study on the Chinese NEV market [3], as an 62 
example, focuses on the policymaker level and is largely descriptive in nature. Kimble and Wang 63 
conducted a survey in the NEV market domain [5], and the innovation in that industry. Again, this 64 
study takes a, largely, descriptive quantitative approach to eliciting, delineating and exploring the 65 
barriers to growth in NEV SMEs. While prior studies have focused on government policies or 66 
industry-level developments, this study directly solicits the opinions of entrepreneurs in the 67 
industry. This approach therefore allows this study to bridge the gap between the higher-level 68 
studies that have been conducted in the past, and to identify the extent to which policies formulated 69 
at these higher levels have been implemented on the ground. 70 
1.4 Article structure  71 
Section 2 provides a background to the climate change problem and the significance of NEVs to 72 
the mitigation dilemma. Section 3 offers a comprehensive literature review on the policy aspects of 73 
climate change and the role of the new energy sector and NEV industry in China. Next, Section 4 74 
describes the methodology used in this study to answer the research question with empirical results 75 
delineated and explored in Section 5. Implications of the findings are discussed in Section 6 before, 76 
finally, Section 7 concludes the study by offering salient policy recommendations, reflecting on 77 
limitations, and makes suggestions for future research. 78 
2. Literature Review 79 
2.1 The role of energy in the global economy and the imperative for a clean energy transition  80 
 Since the 18th century, the energy sector has played an instrumental role in raising the standard 81 
of living around the world. It is also the largest sector, with an economic value of USD $9 trillion, 82 
dwarfing all other global industries [6] (p. 5). Further, the energy sector also provides a vital input 83 
into all other industries.  84 
Notwithstanding the central importance of energy to human activity, the growing consumption 85 
of energy has come at a price. Combustion of natural resources for energy has led to increased GHG 86 
emissions which are linked to adverse climate effects. Deleterious climate events could lead to 87 
catastrophic outcomes including mass crop failures and droughts such that the human race could 88 
face extinction within a century [7].  89 
In essence, shifting to cleaner energy is a matter of survival for the human race. There are 90 
significant economic challenges in shifting to a new energy infrastructure, as considerable resources 91 
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 have been sunk into the development of the current system. This transition is not expected to be easy 92 
or predictable in many respects, creating important environmental and economic uncertainties. 93 
2.2 Climate change, international policy responses, and new energy sources 94 
Anthropogenic activities such as agriculture and the combustion of fossil fuels have been 95 
unequivocally implicated in climate change. Internationally, the debate on climate change over the 96 
past four decades has increasingly gained worldwide attention [8]. While a number of treaties and 97 
agreements have been agreed upon in the past such as the Kyoto Protocol (ratified in 2005), the first 98 
universal legally binding global climate deal was signed in Paris 2015. The Paris Agreement’s aim 99 
was to develop a global action plan to avoid catastrophic climate change by limiting global warming 100 
to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2050.  101 
The key focus of the Paris Agreement is on the use of “new energy,” or energy derived from 102 
renewable resources such as wind, the sun, and water. The most important challenges that need to 103 
be overcome to ensure the uptake and success of new energy across the world are economic, e.g., to 104 
reduce the unit price of new energy so that it is economically viable to deploy renewable energy 105 
technologies. The economic costs of transitioning to a sustainable economy also need to be 106 
considered carefully. There is no doubt a cost involved in upgrading the energy infrastructure to be 107 
driven by new energy sources; this cost could amount to 5.5% of global GDP by 2050 which would 108 
slow global GDP growth by 3.4% [9]. However, there are phenomenal market and non-market costs 109 
associated with delaying this transition or worse, maintaining the status quo; the OECD estimated 110 
that delay could reduce global GDP per capita by 14% [9]. 111 
2.3 Costs and benefits of new energy 112 
While traditional fossil fuel energy sources are more affordable than new energy sources at 113 
present, there is the potential for this to change in future as a consequence of innovation and 114 
harnessing economies of scale and scope. The development and commercialization of new energy 115 
can potentially provide energy to regions that would not otherwise be possible with the current 116 
inefficient infrastructure. The use of new energy can also mitigate some of the negative 117 
environmental impacts that have been driven by large scale urbanization. 118 
2.4 China’s energy sector 119 
China’s economy has been growing rapidly over recent decades which, unfortunately, has also 120 
led to China being the largest emitter of greenhouse gases [10]. As a result of this, the Chinese 121 
government has realized that its current economic model is unsustainable and has developed the 122 
so-called “new normal” focused on higher quality growth of around 7% per year which is socially 123 
and environmental sustainable [11]. Under this framework, there will be specific measures taken to 124 
reduce air pollution [12].  125 
China, however, will need to take into account its resource constraints when steering its new 126 
normal framework. The available evidence suggests that China still relies heavily on fossil fuels. As 127 
of 2014, renewable energy is only 9% of China’s energy mix. Sixty-six percent and twenty percent of 128 
the energy used in China is generated by coal and oil respectively, and dependence on imported oil 129 
and gas is expected to increase by at least 50% by 2030 [11]. Nevertheless, as part of the new normal 130 
developmental framework, China plans to increase its share of non-fossil fuels in the energy mix to 131 
20% by 2030 [13]. There is some evidence that China has been moving towards this goal, as its 132 
renewable energy share of 9% in 2014 represents a substantial increase compared to the turn of the 133 
21st century. Further, in 2014 itself, China installed 70 GW of additional non-coal electrical generation 134 
capacity and 53 GW of new energy projects including solar plants, hydroelectric dams, and wind 135 
farms [14].With a new energy based infrastructure, it may be possible to allow for a de-urbanization 136 
process to ensue as new energy would allow individuals to move to rural areas and yet have 137 
sufficient access to cheap and abundant energy and transportation [15]. 138 
 139 
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 2.5 Changes and innovation in China’s energy sector in the 21st Century 140 
In the past five years, there has been a surge of investment in China’s renewable energy sector. 141 
In 2010, China’s investment in this sector eclipsed major North American and European markets. 142 
For many new technologies such as those associated with wind, energy and nuclear, China is seen as 143 
the prime global market. In 2009 China became the largest market for NEVs [3]. The development of 144 
the NEV market in China has been driven by several factors including the growing industrialization 145 
of the country and rising incomes which had led China to become the fastest growing market for 146 
vehicles in the world. The Chinese government had also seized upon developing the NEV market as 147 
a potential solution to air pollution problems. Since there is still relatively low vehicle ownership in 148 
China, there are opportunities to reduce, or even reverse, the environmental damage in China by 149 
introducing NEVs to reduce emissions [16].  150 
The NEV industry is still in a nascent stage and there will likely need to be significant 151 
development in the industry before it represents a viable alternative to conventional vehicles. To 152 
differentiate themselves from their competitors, many Chinese vehicle manufacturers have also 153 
instituted R&D programs to improve their NEV offerings [17].  The Chinese government has also 154 
pursued several policy initiatives to boost the NEV industry. These measures have included 155 
providing financial support for research and development of NEVs, providing subsidies to 156 
purchasers of NEVs to encourage their adoption, as well as other generous tax and investment 157 
policies to help offset some of the costs of developing these technologies [18]. 158 
This dissertation focuses on Chinese NEV SMEs in the growth phase of their development as 159 
described in Churchill and Lewis (1983) [19]—the company should already have been established 160 
and has survived the early stages of development to achieve some measure of success. The company 161 
thus needs to figure out ways to maintain performance into the future; for instance, whether to 162 
exploit new opportunities in the market or to keep the company stable and profitable in its current 163 
operating domain. 164 
3. Methodology 165 
3.1 Data collection  166 
Opinions vis-à-vis the nature, scope and importance of barriers in the NEV market are elicited 167 
from SME entrepreneurs in China using a structured questionnaire. To meet this objective a hybrid 168 
availability-snowball sampling methodology is employed to identify respondents. The first wave of 169 
individuals targeted in this study are known to the researcher and these respondents then provide 170 
the basis for identifying a larger sample in the second wave. 171 
3.2 Data analysis 172 
Data from the questionnaires will be analyzed using the relative importance index (RII) used in 173 
and Xie et al. (2010) [20] Zeng et al. (2005) [21]. Respondents are asked to consider a list of barriers 174 
and rank them in order of importance on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 represents the least important 175 
factor while 5 represents the most important factor. The RII takes values between 0 and 1 and is 176 
calculated as follows: 177 
RII= (∑ ૑) ⧸ A× N 178 
where a score between 1 and 5 as assigned by the respondent; A is the highest possible score in the 179 
study i.e., 5; and N is the total number of respondents. 180 
3.3 Validity, reliability, and limitations  181 
To ensure content validity, similar studies on innovation in SMEs were reviewed, including 182 
those pertaining to China, so that an exhaustive range of questions was included in the 183 
questionnaire. Similarly, construct validity was minded by designing a study broadly in line with 184 
previous studies on innovation in similar contexts. Since this study is largely exploratory in nature, 185 
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 there are few alternative instruments available for which criterion validity could be established, and 186 
thus this study makes no substantive claims in this regard. 187 
One way to ensure reliability of the measures is to employ a test/retest methodology and 188 
evaluate discrepancies between the results suggested by both tests; a high test-retest correlation 189 
indicates that the results are reliable. This was not pursued herein because of time and resource 190 
constraints which precluded the possibility of a follow up study with the participants. Another 191 
method used to test for internal consistency is Cronbach’s (1951) [22] alpha. Internal consistency is 192 
an estimate of reliability which groups questions on the basis of the concepts they are intended to 193 
capture and assesses whether the responses to intra-concept questions are consistent with one 194 
another. However, it was not possible to use this method herein because each barrier is approached 195 
by just one question in the survey instrument. 196 
Other limitations of the data collected arise due to the sampling methodology and the 197 
exploratory nature of this study. The use of a non-probabilistic sampling methodology means that 198 
the results cannot be generalized to all Chinese NEV SMEs. This limits the scope of the conclusions 199 
that can be drawn from the study. Also, the exploratory nature of the study means that there is 200 
limited evidence from other studies that can be used to testify to the validity and reliability of any 201 
measures used herein. 202 
4. Results 203 
4.1 Respondents’ Characteristics 204 
A total of 120 initial responses were obtained from NEV SME entrepreneurs within two months 205 
of initial solicitation. Twenty of the responses were removed from the sample due to incomplete or 206 
invalid answer sets. Thus, data from a total of 100 respondents are available for analysis. Most of the 207 
entrepreneurs who responded to the study were relatively young: 23% of respondents were 20–30 208 
years old; and 45% were 31–40. Befitting a technologically intense industry, 93% of surveyed 209 
entrepreneurs are educated to degree level or higher with a full 33% of the sample consisting of 210 
entrepreneurs with postgraduate (either Masters or PhD) degrees. Additionally, the majority of the 211 
employees in the companies represented by the surveyed entrepreneurs tended to be educated to at 212 
least degree level: 58% of respondents reported that at least 70% of their employees had 213 
undergraduate degrees or higher. The respondents to the survey were also overwhelmingly male 214 
(84%). Further, 39% were unmarried, 37% married without children, and 24% married with children. 215 
All of the entrepreneurs were already experienced with business and had run businesses in other 216 
sectors prior to being involved in the NEV industry. The most common industries previously 217 
experienced by the respondents were conventional energy (25%), real estate (23%), manufacturing 218 
(20%), and finance and consulting (17%). Interestingly, only 5% of respondents had previous 219 
experience with businesses in the automobile sector.  220 
The companies run by the respondents were generally younger companies. Twenty-seven 221 
percent of respondents reported that their companies were between 1 to 3 years old, while 43% 222 
reported that they had been running the companies for between 3 to 5 years. The companies were 223 
generally small, with 12% of respondents reporting that they had fewer than 100 employees, 20% 224 
from 100 to 200 employees, and 28% of respondents from 200 to 300 employees. Nevertheless, the 225 
companies tended to have a significant amount of assets with 37% of respondents reporting that 226 
their business had assets of between 10 million to 25 million RMB; 28% of respondents reported 227 
assets of between 25 million and 50 million RMB. Start-up costs were also generally quite significant: 228 
31% of entrepreneurs reported that it took between 1 million to 2 million RMB; while 54% provided 229 
figures indicating that the seed capital was 2 million RMB or more. This seed capital was mostly 230 
provided by commercial bank loans (47%) although self-financing (23%) and government bank loans 231 
(15%) were also significant sources of start-up capital. The most common reason given by 232 
respondents for starting their business in the NEV industry was “governmental incentives and 233 
subsidies” (45%), followed by “I have a patented technology and I want to commercialize it” (30%). 234 
“NEV is new to me but with a ‘NEV’ label, I could upgrade my original business model and achieve 235 
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 sustainable development” was a reason given by 15% of respondents, while 10% chose the NEV 236 
industry because it is a “strategic industry [with] promising prospects.” 237 
4.2 Analysis of barriers 238 
Respondents were asked a number of questions aimed at determining the degree to which they 239 
perceived a range of factors to be significant barriers at the stage of business growth in part two of 240 
the questionnaire. The factors were presented based on several themes; specifically, the questions 241 
presented barriers to innovation based on financial, HR, market, legal, and institutional factors. The 242 
results were then collated and the RII was calculated for each of the responses. The results are 243 
summarized in Table 1.  244 
Table 1. Subjectively elicited barriers to NEV SMEs: Descriptive Statistics and RII 245 
Major barriers Mean Standard 
deviation 
RII Rank
Financial     
   Commercial bank loans 2.320 0.909 0.464 28 
   Government loans 2.950 0.925 0.590 24 
   Issuing corporate bonds 4.310 0.907 0.862 8 
   Stock market 4.050 0.947 0.810 15 
   Venture capital 2.880 0.913 0.576 25 
   Private lending 2.110 0.984 0.422 30 
HR     
   Experienced accountants 2.740 1.070 0.548 26 
   Experienced lawyers 2.420 0.806 0.484 27 
   Efficient management team 3.050 0.903 0.610 22 
   Good salesmen 3.280 0.842 0.656 19 
   Public relations professionals 3.160 0.884 0.632 20 
   Employees with foreign language skills 
and global knowledge 
4.160 0.735 0.832 13 
   Promising young scientists 4.720 0.451 0.944 1 
   Scientific support team 3.680 0.723 0.736 17 
   People with innovative ideas 4.280 0.712 0.856 10 
Market     
   Overcapacity in the industry 2.270 1.136 0.454 29 
   Battery range 4.290 0.640 0.858 9 
   Lack of national standards 3.530 0.904 0.706 18 
   Weak linkages with external markets 4.170 0.766 0.834 12 
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    Market acceptance and customer 
preferences 
4.340 0.623 0.868 7 
   Lack of core technology and technology 
development strategy 
4.220 0.675 0.844 11 
   Global economic recession or prosperity 4.020 0.710 0.804 16 
   Input cost and running cost compared to 
gasoline vehicles 
4.140 0.739 0.828 14 
   Lack of charging infrastructure 4.380 0.582 0.876 6 
Legal and institutional     
   Insufficient government support 4.475 0.502 0.886 4 
   Lack of/or unclear regulations 4.636 0.483 0.918 2 
   Government intervenes in business 
activities 
4.525 0.502 0.896 3 
   Numerous heavy taxes 4.465 0.501 0.884 5 
   Local market protection 3.061 0.956 0.606 23 
   Unfair competition 3.091 0.822 0.612 21 
5. Discussion 246 
5.1 Financial barriers 247 
In industrial markets such as automobile manufacturing, financial factors have been considered 248 
to be one of the most significant barriers to entry. In a survey of industrial firms in the US, it was 249 
found that factors such as the capital required to enter markets, the capital intensity of the market, 250 
and the amount of sunk costs involved in entering the market represented highly significant barriers 251 
to entry [23]. The presence of financial barriers to entry makes it more difficult for potential market 252 
entrants to challenge incumbents where they do not have access to the resources necessary to secure 253 
market entry. This is particularly relevant in the case of SMEs because they typically require more 254 
external financing than larger firms as they tend to have insufficient cash flows to both sustain their 255 
current business and pursue growth objectives [24]. Importantly SMEs especially rely on external 256 
financing at the inception and growth phases [25]. 257 
Moving on, this study found that access to financial markets was one of the concerns of SMEs 258 
although not the primary concern. In general, the results broadly correspond with the findings of 259 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) [26] who showed that Chinese private sector firms tend to rely on informal 260 
financing rather than formal alternatives like banks. The respondents, on average, found the fewest 261 
difficulties with obtaining private lending (2.11) followed by commercial bank loans (2.32). Venture 262 
capital was viewed as the next simplest form of business financing (2.88). The most difficult forms of 263 
financing were those that involve capital markets such as the stock (4.05) and bond (4.31) markets. 264 
This is likely because the mechanism by which SMEs in China are able to raise money in capital 265 
markets remain at an early stage of development. Long (2014), [27] for instance, noted how the 266 
Growth Enterprise Market of China (GEMC), designed for emerging entrepreneurial companies, 267 
was only established in 2009. Additionally, Chinese stock markets typically function poorly due to 268 
corporate opacity, political rent seeking, and weak enforcement of property rights [26]. Bond 269 
markets may be even more constrained than equity markets as the institutions associated with the 270 
former tend to be monopolized by the state, subject to excessive regulation, and are still at an early 271 
stage of development [26, 28, 29].  272 
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 5.2 Human resource barriers 273 
Although financial infrastructure and other factors such as market and legal factors are 274 
important in driving the adoption of new technologies, human resources are also important. 275 
Theoretical frameworks, for instance, have been designed which explore the interplay of 276 
technologies with human and other resources for determining whether organizations are able to 277 
incorporate IT into their business processes [30]. Research has also shown that clusters of 278 
creativity—locations in which there are concentrations of innovative firms—can only emerge if there 279 
is a wide range of supportive human resources in the form of expert accountants, lawyers, and other 280 
skilled professionals to provide the services necessary to support innovative businesses [31, 32] . 281 
Further, the innovation process itself is dependent on human resources and how those human 282 
resources are managed, and a failure to harness human resources can impede a firm’s innovation 283 
capabilities [33].  284 
This study revealed one significant human resource barrier: the lack of promising young 285 
scientists (4.72) which was also the factor with the highest RII (0.944) suggesting that respondents to 286 
the survey found this to be the most pressing barrier to innovation in Chinese NEV SMEs. A possible 287 
reason for this has been highlighted in previous research: the focus of the Chinese education system 288 
on passing examinations rather than nurturing the creativity needed for an innovating industry like 289 
the NEV industry. Although the education system in China has been substantially revamped over 290 
time with a greater emphasis on developing innovation and creativity, many of these changes have 291 
only been undertaken in the last 20 years which suggests that any improvements in creativity and 292 
innovation may not have had sufficient time to filter through to the workforce [34]. Also, despite 293 
these changes, there are concerns that the education system appears to be successful in fostering 294 
greater creativity only in younger students while scores on several measures of creativity and 295 
innovation decrease in middle school and higher [35]. 296 
Another possible reason why Chinese SMEs face a lack of skilled and innovative workers is the 297 
presence of a brain drain. Many highly educated and skilled Chinese workers, such as scientists, 298 
have become used to foreign cultures after they have lived and studied in other countries and are 299 
reluctant to return to China [36]. This is exacerbated by the fact that education has become 300 
increasingly internationalized which has allowed Chinese students, especially those from financially 301 
able families, to access higher education in other countries [37]. 302 
One other significant human resource issue that arose was the lack of employees with foreign 303 
language skills and global knowledge (RII = 0.832). A possible reason for this may be that the pace of 304 
economic and business growth in China has outstripped the capabilities of the Chinese education 305 
system to equip its people with the necessary skills. For instance, while English is a compulsory 306 
subject in China, many Chinese students, even at the tertiary level, report difficulties in 307 
communicating effectively in English [38]. 308 
5.3 Market barriers 309 
Market conditions can also prove to be significant barriers. One example is the lack of physical 310 
infrastructure; for instance, poor transport infrastructure has been shown to serve as a strong barrier 311 
to the development of textiles and electronics manufacturing industries in Brazil [39]. In the case of 312 
NEVs, the most obvious case is the lack of available charging infrastructure (RII = 0.876). This 313 
corroborates the findings of Sweda and Klabjan (2011) [40] who found that the lack of a public 314 
charging infrastructure is, frequently, one of the most significant barriers to the adoption of NEVs. 315 
Needless to say, potential NEV buyers are reluctant to commit to a big-ticket purchase unless they 316 
know they have convenient charging access outside the home. While investors are generally 317 
reluctant to commit to building a large charging infrastructure without knowing the actual demand 318 
for NEVs. These limitations of the available technology are more obvious when considering the fact 319 
that the battery range (RII = 0.858), and the lack of core technology and technology development (RII 320 
= 0.844), were also found to be significant market barriers to the adoption of NEVs. These factors, 321 
when combined with one another, suggest that a single phenomenon of “range anxiety,” i.e., 322 
consumers’ concerns that NEV range not be sufficient for their daily needs, may be responsible for 323 
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 reducing the market acceptance of battery-operated NEVs. Dong et al. (2014) [41] showed that this 324 
may be the case.  325 
Other studies have found evidence that supports the finding that technology limitations have a 326 
significant effect on the adoption of NEVs. Egbue and Long (2012) [42] investigated the adoption 327 
rate of EVs in the US and found that consumer demand for EVs was inhibited by similar concerns 328 
about the technology; most respondents explained that they found the technology unfamiliar and 329 
were thus reluctant to commit to EVs. Sierzchula et al. (2014) [43] carried out a similar study with 330 
consumers in the Netherlands and found that the single most significant factor in determining the 331 
adoption of EVs was the availability of charging infrastructure. 332 
5.4 Legal and institutional barriers 333 
Legal and institutional factors were found, in this study, to be the most powerful barriers to the 334 
development of NEV SMEs in China. This was somewhat expected at the initiation of the study 335 
because the Chinese government maintains a strong hold over the economy and there is evidence 336 
that Chinese government policies tend to be relatively uncoordinated at the operational level which 337 
makes the regulatory environment more complicated. Additionally, the overall tax policy and 338 
burden in China is one of the most onerous in the world [44]. 339 
Indeed, various legal and institutional barriers were cited by the respondents as the 2nd to the 5th 340 
most significant barriers to NEV SMEs in their growth phase. A lack of, or unclear, regulations in 341 
particular, had the highest RII score (0.918) in this category. Gerst and Gao (2015) [45] highlight that 342 
the regulatory process for NEVs is particularly complicated. This is because the focus of NEV 343 
standards is on interoperability between various technologies which depends heavily on the input of 344 
stakeholders from many different industries. Additionally, the market and environment for NEVs is 345 
dynamic and constantly changing, not least of which because of the technological barriers that the 346 
industry needs to overcome, such as lack of charging infrastructure and limited range of vehicles 347 
afforded by current battery technology. The need for interoperability between the various 348 
technologies exacerbates some of the tensions that arise; for instance, some manufacturers may 349 
experience market pressures to protect intellectual property rights. Yet, the success of the NEV 350 
depends on interoperability of the various components that comprise the vehicle, which implies 351 
intellectual property sharing. 352 
Another important consideration in China’s case is the protection of intellectual property (IP) 353 
rights. China has been considered to have a particularly poor record in protecting IP [46]. 354 
Nevertheless, Ang et al. (2014) [47] examined the various IP laws and the international treaties that 355 
China had acceded and found that the IP laws in China exceeded some of the protections offered by 356 
the laws in some developed countries. Thus, while proper legislation to protect IP rights exists in 357 
China, the enforcement of IP rights is left down to the provinces and may vary widely between 358 
them. Ang et al. (2014) [47] found that those provinces which better enforcement IP rights also had 359 
more R&D investments, generated a larger number of patents, and had greater sales from new 360 
products. These results indicate that the enforcement of IP legislation matters just as much as 361 
ensuring that IP legislation exists, and that rationalizing the enforcement of IP legislation across 362 
China could be of benefit to the Chinese NEV SME sector. 363 
The next most significant legal or institutional barrier to the development of NEV SMEs in 364 
China is the presence of government intervention in business. The government plays an 365 
extraordinarily large role in the Chinese economy when compared with many other countries. The 366 
Chinese government’s role in business is exercised through its significant ownership of state-owned 367 
enterprises (SOEs) and listed SOEs still dominate the Chinese capital markets. Additionally, the 368 
effect of government policies in several industries such as natural resources, civil aviation, real 369 
estate, and finance, has been to favor SOEs such that private firms have been crowded out [48].  370 
In the case of the NEV industry, Liu and Kokko (2013) [49] suggested that various branches of 371 
the Chinese government are closely involved in managing innovation in the Chinese NEV industry. 372 
The government, broadly, plays two roles therein. First, the government prioritizes and allocates 373 
investments in the NEV industry to the relevant industry players. Second, it regulates and 374 
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 coordinates policies to develop the NEV industry in China. Liu and Kokko (2013) [49] explained that 375 
the most relevant actors in the NEV industry were car manufacturers who conducted most of the 376 
R&D to develop NEV technology in collaboration with research universities and other research 377 
institutions. Most of these car companies and research organizations were, in China, public 378 
institutions either wholly or partly owned by the government. There is thus the likelihood that, as 379 
observed in other sectors, the Chinese government could enact policies that favor state-owned 380 
institutions at the expense of private enterprise. 381 
6. Conclusion 382 
6.1 Policy proposals 383 
One of the main hindrances to the growth of Chinese NEV SMEs was access to formal modes of 384 
financing such as bond and equity markets. Zhu et al. (2012) [44] suggested that one of the issues that 385 
limits the access of Chinese SMEs to formal financing was that the SME Promotion Law enacted by 386 
the Chinese government did not have sufficient concrete policies that could be enforced 387 
operationally. For instance, there were few incentives under the SME Promotion Law to encourage 388 
Chinese banks or other providers of capital to properly value the IP generated by innovative firms 389 
such as NEV SMEs. Additionally, Wang et al. (2015) [50] found that Chinese banks were less 390 
comfortable in providing financing to those SMEs who had a strong reliance on R&D expenditure to 391 
develop their businesses. As a result, one possible policy measure that the Chinese government 392 
could take to encourage NEV SME financing would be to develop operational guidelines vis-à-vis 393 
the assessment and valuation of R&D potential of Chinese SMEs, so that they are able to access 394 
financing according to their development needs.  395 
Apart from bank financing, bond and equity markets in China also need to be developed so that 396 
SMEs can tap alternative formal sources of capital besides bank financing. The Chinese bond market 397 
is generally on the right track given that those markets are widening access to foreign buyers so that 398 
there is a wider pool of participating investors instead of relying solely on Chinese institutions [51]. 399 
Increasing participation in capital markets could be particularly beneficial to innovative companies 400 
like NEV SMEs, as international investors may be less likely to exhibit conservative biases against 401 
businesses with high R&D requirements. Thus, such a measure could increase the ability of NEV 402 
SMEs to raise capital through bond markets. 403 
One other policy measure to increase formal financing options to young and innovative firms 404 
would be to develop an equity market that specializes in the trading of SME equity [52]. This was 405 
addressed, to some extent, when the Chinese government expanded over-the-counter (OTC) market 406 
access to qualified SMEs [53]. Nevertheless, this policy measure had limited impact due to lack of 407 
investor interest as a result of the tight regulations on equity markets which thus constrain those 408 
equity markets. Therefore, one policy measure that should be considered over the long term would 409 
be to liberalize the Chinese economy and relax equity market regulations so that the Chinese equity 410 
markets become more attractive to investors and SMEs are better able to tap the equity markets for 411 
capital.  412 
Beyond lack of access to formal forms of financing, another significant issue faced by Chinese 413 
NEV SMEs is the presence of legal and institutional barriers. One of the most significant legal or 414 
institutional barriers arises due to the lack of coordination between the different government 415 
agencies governing the NEV industry. Different aspects of NEV policy are addressed by different 416 
agencies. The Chinese government should therefore consider consolidating governance over NEV 417 
policy into a single “renewable energy department” so that all government policies regarding 418 
renewable energy—not just NEVs—can be implemented more effectively. An example that could be 419 
pursued further is the development of industrial clusters similar to what has been termed the 420 
“Zhejiang model” [54] 421 
Another issue arises due to the fact that the Chinese government, either partially or wholly, 422 
holds stakes in a number of significant players in the NEV industry [49]. While this may crowd out 423 
private players from the NEV industry, the Chinese government can also take advantage of its 424 
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 market power to coordinate alliances between companies, research institutes, and universities, so 425 
that collaboration within an alliance and competition between alliances can lead to a more robust 426 
innovative culture. To address the current lack of demand exhibited by Chinese consumers for 427 
NEVs, the government could provide financial incentives to offset some of the cost advantages that 428 
traditional vehicles still have over NEVs. 429 
Finally, the single most important barrier to the development of Chinese NEV SMEs has been 430 
the lack of skilled scientists. This could be due to the internationalization of higher education where 431 
financially able Chinese students have been incentivized to pursue higher education in other 432 
countries and then remain in those countries, contributing to their workforce instead of returning to 433 
China. Extant policy measures have not been able to completely address the brain drain issue, thus 434 
the Chinese government could take further action by negotiating with host countries to address 435 
ways in which these individuals could be encouraged to return to China [55]. Additionally, the 436 
Chinese government will need to investigate and address some of the push factors, including aspects 437 
of cultural, economic, social, and educational policies, which contribute towards the brain drain. 438 
6.2 Limitations and future studies 439 
There are several limitations that need to be considered when interpreting the results of this 440 
study. First, survey respondents were captured via a non-probabilistic sampling method. This 441 
means that the sample is likely to be biased and the results of this study cannot be generalized to the 442 
population of NEV SMEs. Second, the questionnaire used in this study was designed by the 443 
researcher but was not trialed before it was implemented on the research sample. Thus, there is a 444 
risk that some of the questions used therein may have been misinterpreted by certain respondents, 445 
which could have biased some of the results in this study. Future studies should therefore be aimed 446 
at overcoming these limitations.  447 
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